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WILLIAMS v. BROWN MANUFACTURING COMPANY:
DEFENSES BASED ON PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT IN
STRICT LIABILITY
The Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of Williams v. Brown
Manufacturing Company,' outlined the types of conduct on the
part of a plaintiff which will bar recovery in an action based upon
strict liability in tort, and the burden of pleading and proof that
must be borne by each party. The court's first opinion attempted
to resolve the confusion about the role of contributory negligence
in Illinois strict liability actions 2 by ruling that the plaintiff must
plead and prove his exercise of due care for his own safety,3 as
in Illinois negligence actions.4 - On rehearing, the court superceded that ruling by holding that in strict liability:
1) ". . . contributory negligence, as it is known in this
State, is not a bar to recovery... , and the plaintiff need
not plead and prove his exercise of due care,' but,

2) assumption of risk, to which a "fundamentally subjective" standard is applied, is an affirmative defense.6
"Misuse" was also described as a bar to recovery.7 This note is
an appraisal of the court's reasoning and the effect of the new
rules on Illinois strict liability law.,
FACTS

Williams was injured while operating a trench digging machine made by the Brown Manufacturing Company.9 The digging teeth caught momentarily on an underground pipe and, because the drive belts were not adjusted to slip if such an obstacle
were encountered, the engine built up a reacting force. When
the teeth suddenly slipped off the pipe, the trencher bucked,
knocked Williams down, and ran over him. Williams sued the
manufacturer in strict liability, alleging that an unreasonably
145 Ill.
2d 418, 261
2 See text following

N.E.2d 305 (1970).

note 30 infra.
sWilliams v. Brown Mfg. Co., No. 41425 (March, 1969).

4 The court cites Carter v. Winter, 32 Ill. 2d 275, 282, 204 N.E.2d 755,
758 (1965) for a statement of that rule in negligence actions. Id. and 45
Ill. 2d 418, 425, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309 (1970
5 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 ll. 2d 418, 427, 261 N.E.2d 305,
310 (1970).
8 Id. at 430, 261 N.E.2d at 312.
7 Id. at 431, 261 N.E.2d at 312.
8 This note is limited to the issue of defenses based on plaintiff's conduct
in strict liability. Product liability actions based on strict liability in tort
will be referred to simply as strict liability actions.
9The most detailed factual statement is in the appellate opinion, Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 349-57, 236 N.E.2d 125, 134-37
(1968).
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dangerous condition of the trencher, which existed at the time it
left the manufacturer's control, was the proximate cause of his
injury. 10
Plaintiff charged that certain defects in the design of the
trencher 1 and failure to warn that it was unsafe to guide the
trencher by the handlebars from behind created unreasonably
dangerous conditions. Defendant denied that the alleged defects
created unreasonably dangerous conditions. Defendant also asserted the affirmative defense that plaintiff had assumed the risk
of injury because he was aware of the danger of improper belt
adjustment. There was evidence plaintiff had read the manual
accompanying the machine but disagreement on whether the
manual effectively warned of the danger." The trial court directed a verdict for plaintiff on the affirmative defense of assumption of risk.1 3 The jury, agreeing in special interrogatories that
the machine was unreasonably dangerous, 4 returned a verdict
for plaintiff.
10 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), in
announcing the doctrine of strict liability in Illinois, defined the elements:
The plaintiffs must prove that their injury or damage resulted from a
condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one and that the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer's control.
Id. at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
11 In Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125
(1968), the appellate court summarized the testimony of the plaintiff's expert
witness on design:
He expressed the opinion that it is difficult to keep machinery adjusted
so it is tight enough to drive, yet loose enough to slip at the right time.
He suggested that a better design, which could be effected without substantial increase in cost of producing the trencher, would be to use a
positive direct drive and an extra auxiliary-type clutch set to slip at
some prescribed force and thus prevent excessive lurching.
Id. at 353, 236 N.E.2d at 135.
12 The portions of the manual which are pertinent here are:
ADJUSTMENTS AND MAINTENANCE
"The engine is bolted stationary to the machine, and when the drive
belts become loose enough to slip, adjust them by the threaded shaft on
the right hand clutch lever. Caution - do not adjust the belts too tight:
they must be able to slip under shock load."
"Service and Maintenance Tips on Bus Brown
Trenchers"
"Short Belt Life: Belts that are adjusted too tight may turn sideways, also not be able to slip under shock load."
Possible Cause
"Shearing Woodruff Keys ......
and Remedy."
"Generally the drive belts are adjusted too tight especially on the
model 468R, the drive belts must be adjusted so they do not slip under
normal trenching, but should be loose enough to slip when some object
gets caught in the digging chain, if the belts cannot slip, there is no
protection against sudden shock."
"Suggestions for Safety: Always stop the engine before adjusting
belts, chains, etc."
Id. at 350, 236 N.E.2d at 135.
131d. at 345, 236 N.E.2d at 132.
14 Did the power unit of the Bus Brown Trencher Unit 468R lack
a proper safety throw-out clutch or some other safety device on the
digger part and the propelling unit to prevent the machine from bucking
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THE PROBLEM PRESENTED

Plaintiff did not allege his exercise of due care or freedom
from contributory negligence in the strict liability count.

De-

fendant contended that failure to do so was error. Plaintiff contended that contributory negligence was an affirmative defense.
The case announcing strict liability in Illinois, Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 15 had not dealt with the problem. But People ex. rel.
General Motors Corp. v. Bua16 had suggested that plaintiff must
prove due care in strict liability.1" However, the trial court
denied defendant's successive motions to dismiss, for directed
verdict, and for post-trial relief, all grounded on the plaintiff's
failure to allege due care.'
The appellate court had difficulty reconciling Illinois law
with the trial court's treatment of contributory negligence.
From the observation by the Illinois Supreme Court in Suvada
that its position coincided with that of §402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 19 the appellate court implied approval of com-

ment n of that section, 20 which reads:

n. Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this
Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller, but is
strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases (see §524)
applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense
when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the
defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its
when the digger hit an obstruction in the ground?
"Yes.
Did the Bus Brown Trencher Unit 468R lack proper adjustment
methods on the drive belts to allow slippage of the propelling wheels if
the digger hit an obstruction in the ground?
"Yes.
"Was the Bus Brown Trencher Unit 468R unreasonably dangerous
to the user because there was no warning or notice on said machine that
it was dangerous to operate it from behind and between the handle bars?
"Yes.
Id. at 357, 236 N.E.2d at 137.
15 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
16 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
17 The Bua court said:
This is a products liability case pleaded in two counts, one alleging
negligence, and the other alleging breach of warranty. In Suvada v.
White ... this court adopted the theory which imposes strict tort liability
on the manufacturer. Under that theory, negligence need not be proved
...
. However, under both counts it is necessary to prove that the
plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for his own safety.
Id. at 196, 226 N.E.2d at 15-16.
In a products liability case the objects of discovery on the part of a
plaintiff against the manufacturer could not relate either to the issue
of damages, or to the issue of the plaintiff's freedom from contributory
negligence.
Id. at 197, 226 N.E.2d at 16.
is Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 345, 236 N.E.2d
125, 131 (1968).
19 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 621, 210 N.E.2d 182,
187 (1965).
20 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 346, 236 N.E.2d
125, 132 (1968).
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existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence
which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of
assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other
cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the
defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is
barred from recovery.
To render that view consistent with People ex. rel. General
Motors Corp. v. Bua, which the court admitted had decided contributory negligence was properly an issue in a strict liability
case, 21 the appellate court construed Bua as not conclusive upon
"the nature of contributory negligence which would serve to bar
plaintiff's recovery, nor upon whom falls the burden of pleading
and proof." 22 The appellate court then felt justified in limiting
contributory negligence to the description of assumption of risk
in comment n:
For the purposes of this opinion contributory negligence is defined
as voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger or proceeding unreasonably to make use of a product
after discovery of a defect and becoming aware of the danger. 28
In holding that contributory negligence was an affirmative
defense and that a subjective standard applied, the appellate
court relied on another appellate court's statement that making
chattels safe for their intended purpose is the policy reason underlying strict liability.24 It held that such "contributory negligence" was an affirmative defense 25 because:
It appears unjust and incongruous to place the burden of proof of
freedom from contributory fault upon a user, entitled to rely upon
the product's being fit for its intended use, and not charged with
expert knowledge. In our opinion the same reasoning which justifies the doctrine of strict liability compels the *adoption of the

rule

. . . 26

The appellate court held that the test of contributory fault was
subjective 27 because the purposes to be served by strict liability
would be advanced if ". . . contributory fault should not bar recovery, unless the total circumstances show the plaintiff has proceeded unreasonably to use the product after discovery of the deId. at 347, 236 N.E.2d at 132-33.
Id.
Accord, Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App.
2d 315, 331 229 N.E.2d 684, 692 (1967), aff'd onr other grounds, 42 Ill. 2d
339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969). See note 17 supra.
22 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 347, 236 N.E.2d
21
22

125, 133 (1968).
24 The appellate court quoted:
...
the duty contemplated by the court in Suvada is one of making the
chattel safe for the use for which it was sup plied " Dunham v. Vaughn &
Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 [ill. App. 2d] 315, [325,1 229 N.E.2d 684, [689
(1967)].
Id. at 348, 236 N.E.2d at 133.
25

28
27

Id. at 347, 236 N.E.2d at 133.

Id. at 348, 236 N.E.2d at 133.
Id. at 347-48, 236 N.E.2d at 133.
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fect and becoming aware of the danger.

'2

The directed verdict

for plaintiff on the issue of assumption of risk was accordingly
9

affirmed.2

OTHER APPELLATE VIEWS

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the general problem of
plaintiff's conduct in strict liability was reviewed. Williams was
not the only case that had dealt with the problem. Five other appellate cases3 ° and two federal cases- applying Illinois law were
cited by the Illinois Supreme Court as having treated the subject
of plaintiff's conduct in strict liability actions since Suvada.
In Brandenburg v. Weaver Manufacturing Company82 the

first appellate case, the affirmative defenses33 were found to raise
plaintiff's conduct as an issue.3 4 The appellate court reasoned
that the Suvada requirement, that an unreasonably dangerous

condition must be the proximate cause of injury, could not be
shown if plaintiff's failure to use due care were the proximate
cause of injury.85 In finding the issue of contributory negligence
Id. at 349, 236 N.E.2d at 133-34.
Id. at 365, 236 N.E.2d at 141.
In affirming, the appellate court narrowly applied its definition and test
of contributory negligence. It found no evidence that plaintiff had assumed
the risk of a sudden lurch backward while standing between the handlebars
since the only language it could take to be a warning spoke of forward
movement. Id. at 364, 236 N.E.2d at 141.
30 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970):
Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (1968), 101 Ill. App. 2d 356, 243 N.E.2d 843;
Vlahovich v. Betts Machine Co. (1968), 101 Ill. App. 2d 123, 242 N.E.2d
17, petition for leave to appeal allowed 40 Ill. 2d 580; Sweeney v.
Matthews (1968), 94 Ill.
App. 2d 6, 16-26 [236 N.E.2d 439); Dunham v.
Bushnell Mfg. Co. (1968), 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 331-32, affirmed without
discussion of this issue, 42 Ill. 2d 339 [247 N.E.2d 401] (1969) ; Brandenburg v. Weaver Manufacturing Co., (1967), 77 Ill. App. 2d 274 [222
N.E.2d 348].
Id. at 424, 261 N.E.2d at 308-309.
81 " . . .Dazenko v. James Mach. Co. (7th cir 1968) 393 F.2d 287, 29091, and in Raigan v. Chainbelt, Inc., No. 66-C-1563 (N.D.E.D. Ill. 1967).
" Id. at 424, 261 N.E.2d at 308.
28

29

2

77 Ill. A pp. 2d 374, 222 N.E.2d 348 (1966).

A mechanic was injured

by an automobile that fell on him because he used a jack, the lifting arms of
which were too short and which he knew was experimental, even though
other means of lifting the automobile were available. The court affirmed a
directed verdict for defendant by applying an earlier court's description of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
88 Defendant's answer charged by way of affirmative defense that
plaintiff's injuries were sustained by reason of (a) his failure to use
safety stands under the automobile and (b) his failure to properly place
the jack and see that it was safely installed.
Id. at 376, 222 N.E.2d. at 349..
84 Id.
at 377, 222 N.E.2d at 349-50.
85 Id. at 377, 222 N.E.2d at 350.
The court in Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779
(Tex. .1967.), was impressed by the fact, appropriate to these cases, that:
"this area of the law is permeated, with semantic problems, *** [and
that] principles of contributory negligence and assumption of risk may
overlap considerations of proxunate cause ... " 4 A.L.R. 3rd 501 1. c.
503.
Id. at 785.
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inescapably implied by the proximate cause requirement, the
court used some forceful language:
'Suvada is a landmark decision which effectively destroys lack of
privity as a defense. It decides the sufficiency of a complaint. We
do not read it as providing the open sesame to the strongbox of
producers nor that it ipso facto embalms and lays to rest defenses
based on the fault, misuse or misconduct of the plaintiff which contributed in whole or in part to his injuries. We do not believe that
it hatched a philosophy of liability without fault in products liability cases nor permits one to recover for injuries which are
properly traceable to and occasioned by his own fault. Plaintiff
must still prove that it was the unreasonably dangerous condition
of the product which proximately caused the injuries. 86
The appellate court in Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Manufacturing Co. 37 cited Bua to support the requirement that plain-

tiff prove due care.3 8 But in answer to the contention that contributory negligence is not a defense in strict liability, the same
court that had written the Brandenburg opinion39 now cited and
rephrased comment n of §402A to describe the type of contributory negligence that may be an issue in strict liability. Although
these remarks were incidental to a discussion of whether testimony on custom was admissible to prove foreseeable use, the
court indicated its understanding and acceptance of the rule of
comment n by observing that testimony suggesting plaintiff was
aware of the defect which caused his injury made this issue of
plaintiff's knowledge particularly relevant.40
In Sweeney v. Matthews41 the appellate court dealt at length
with the defense of assumption of risk in strict liability.42 In response to the objection that the doctrine of assumption of risk is
restricted to master-servant or other contractual relationships in
Illinois, the court reviewed Illinois law to show that the Illinois
43
position was a historical accident and an anomaly in the law,

concluding:
36 77 Ill.
App. 2d 374, 377, 222 N.E.2d 348, 350 (1966).

3786 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684 (1967), aff'd on other grounds,
42 Ill.
2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969). A farmer lost an eye'when a chip
broke off the hammer he was, using to tap a metal pin into place because
the hammer had become "work hardened" by eleven months of use. The
appellate court and the supreme court agreed there was enough evidence to
go the jury, both courts being mainly concerned with answering how the
manufacturer could be responsible for the hammer's condition since it was
not defective when it was sold.
38 Id. at 320, 229 N.E.2d at 686.
39 See text following note 32 supra.
4086 111. App. 2d 315, 331, 229 N.E.2d 684, 692 (1967).
41 94 Ill.
App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968). A carpenter, after the first
three or four concrete nails he was hammering broke off and shot across
the room, struck another which shattered, causing him to lose an eye. The
court felt that while ordinarily a verdict would be directed against plaintiff,
because of the circumstances, including plaintiff's age and experience, plaintiff's conduct was a borderline question properly given to the jury.
42 Id. at 17-26, 236 N.E.2d at 444-47.

43Id. at 18-20, 236 N.E.2d at 444.46.

19701

Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co.

The present restricted application of the defense of assumption of
risk should be reviewed; but irrespective of whether the defense
it cannot logically be prois permitted in all negligence actions,
44
hibited in strict liability actions.

In reasoning that assumption of risk is a proper defense to strict
liability the court took a position similar to that of the appellate
court in Williams, but, instead of restricting contributory negligence to conduct equivalent to assumption of risk, it recognzied
assumption of risk itself as a proper defense.4'5 The court reasoned:
The ultimate user has no duty to inspect a product to see if it is
free of defects. Unless a defect is obvious, he has the right to
assume that the product is safe. . . . Failure to discover the deto
fects is not contributory negligence; deliberately proceeding
46
use the product after discovery is assumption of risk.

Then, after quoting commentators and §402A comment n to show
that its position was the general view, the court construed Bua7as
inconclusive on defenses and implied approval of comment n.4

After the Williams appellate decision, the appellate court in
Vlahovich v. Betts48 split three ways on the nature of a plaintiff's
conduct which should bar recovery.4 9 Their divergent views on

comment n were determinative of the causation issue being appealed.

If contributory negligence were not an issue, the causa-

tion instruction was erroneous. One judge thought plaintiff's
negligence was not an issue because defendant's negligence was
not an issue. 50 Another judge thought the rules developed by the
appellate court in Williams should be used.51 The third judge
thought plaintiff's negligence should be an issue just as in negli-

the appellate degence actions and he vigorously disapproved of
52
cisions of Williams and Sweeney v. Matthews.
44 Id.
45 Id.

at 20-1, 236 N.E.2d at 446.
at 21-6, 236 N.E.2d at 446-47.
46 Id. at 21, 236 N.E.2d at 446.
47 Id. at 24, 236 N.E.2d at 447.
However, the failure to give an instruction on assumption of risk was found not prejudicial since the contributory negligence instruction given was of greater benefit to the defendant.
48 101 I1. App. 2d 123, 242 N.E.2d 17 (1968). A truck driver's eye was
injured when a plastic clearance light lens he was removing to replace the
bulb shattered in sub-zero weather. He testified that they had broken before, and that they were not always maintained properly. The jury returned
a verdict for defendant.
49 The main issue on appeal was whether it was error to eliminate the
section on the effect of concurring causes from the Illinois Pattern Instruction on proximate cause. Id. at 126, 242 N.E.2d at 19.
50 Id. at 124-28, 242 N.E.2d at 18-20. Through him, the court reversed
because concurring causation instructions were eliminated in negligence
actions where only the conduct of the parties was involved, so that the defense of contributory negligence would not be prejudiced. But since plaintiff's negligence was not an issue here, the jury was prevented from returning a verdict for plaintiff if, as it might reasonably find, there were
concurring causes.
51 Id. at 129-32, 242 N.E.2d at 20-1. He concurred in the reversal.
His dissent favored affirmance.
52 Id. at 132-35, 242 N.E.2d at 21-2.
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In Adams v. Ford Motor Company" the same appellate court
which decided Williams approved the affirmative defense offered
because it alleged conduct within the definition of contributory
negligence given in Williams."
Two early federal cases took a conservative, hedging position
on the Illinois law regarding defenses based on a plaintiff's conduct. In Dazenko v. James HunterMachine Company55 a federal
appellate court, relying on Bua, reversed the district court for not
instructing the jury on contributory negligence. It noted comment n and Dunham's indication that contributory negligence
"... can exist only where the plaintiff proceeds after discovery of
a defect or with knowledge of danger,'56 apparently as a possible
direction Illinois law might take, in which case the obviousness
of the hazard involved would be relevant. 57 The federal district
court in Regain v. Chainbelt Inc."" also thought an allegation of
due care was necessary in Illinois in 1967," 9 although it too noted
comment n and implied that a firm rule was still evolving.

THE ALTERNATIVES
These were the options for treating contributory negligence
as developed by the appellate courts. Of course, the supreme
court was neither limited by appellate suggestions nor bound on
this question by its previous decisions.60 It was free to adopt or
formulate any rule in this emerging area that in its judgment
was just.
The competing alternatives are basically reflections of two
views of how strict liability has changed the law. The defense
bar and those who regard strict liability as a procedural development which merely eliminates the difficulty of proving negligence
usually see no reason why a plaintiff should not continue to plead
and prove his exercise of due care.6 1 To allow a negligent plaintiff to recover from a defendant who may not be truly negligent
is to them an unjust extension of the liability imposed in Suvada.
53 103 Ill. App. 2d 356, 243 N.E.2d 843 (1968). Plaintiff proved to the
jury that the accident happened because one of six bolts that secured the
cab of the truck to the frame was missing. Defendant was not allowed to
plead that plaintiff was contributorily negligent by speeding and driving

under the influence of liquor because the court accepted the plaintiff's contention that the defendant must allege that such conduct was the sole, and
not a contributory cause of injury. The appellate court found no merit in
that contention and therefore reversed.
54 Id. at 360, 243 N.E.2d 846.
55393 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
Id.at 290, n. 5.
57 Id. at 290, n. 5.
58 No. 66-C-1563 (N.D.E.D. Ill.
1967).
59 Id., Proceedings of Jan. 19, 1967, p. 6.
60 See text at notes 21 and 22.
61 Cf. Brandenburg opinion at note 36 supra and Groark, Contributory
Negligence
(1968).

-

An Integral Part of Product Liability Cases, 56 ILL.: B.J.

904
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The plaintiff bar and those who regard strict liability as a
substantive development which increases the defendant's duty
and responsibility in products liability usually sense that there
should be a corresponding increase in plaintiff's right 2 and a
decrease in his responsibility23 Prosser's64 rationalization of the
early cases in terms of contributory negligence and assumption
of risk, furthered by comment n of §402A, seems to have been
accepted by most courts as the proper modification of contributory negligence for strict liability cases." It was the prevailing
view in the appellate courts. 6
THE SOLUTION OFFERED

The Illinois Supreme Court, however, rejected any modification of contributory negligence in its first opinion.6 7 While it accepted strict liability as a doctrine aimed at socially negligent
manufacturers and suppliers,6 8 it was not persuaded to change
the traditional Illinois contributory negligence rule.69 The court
admitted that the decisions of most other jurisdictions barred recovery when the plaintiff's conduct did not amount to assumption
of risk.70 It identified negligent failure to discover the defect as
71
the situation that would be affected by adopting comment n.
But it found it unnecessary to discuss the rationale used by the
proponents of the Restatement position.
In the court's view, adopting comment n would not effect
62 Cf. Williams appellate opinion in text at note 26 supra.

6SCf Sweeney opinion in text at note 46 supra and Po8tilion, Strict Liability and Contributory Negligence - The Two Just Don't Mix, 57 ILL. B.J.
26 (1968).

Theoretically, the court could take the radical position that no conduct on
the part of a plaintiff barred recovery. This view was sometimes suggested
where the necessity of pleading due care was at issue, because it was urged
that, if defendant's negligence is not an issue, plaintiff's conduct is not an
issue either. But plaintiff's conduct is not measured against defendant's
conduct; it is measured against a standard. It is unlikely that Illinois courts
would accept an argument which advocates eliminating all plaintiff conduct
requirements. Cf. text at note 50 supra.
64 PROSSER, LAW Op TORTS, 3rd ed., §76, pp. 538, 539 (1964).

65 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co.. No. 41425 (March, 1969).
The majority of the cases involving claims based on strict liability in
tort have stopped at the "assumption of the risk" level and refused to
permit contributory negligence as measured by the objective standard
to bar recovery. Shamrock Fuel & Oil Snles Co. v. Tunks (Tex. 1967),
416 S.W.2d 779; 0. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller (1968), 103 Ariz. 556, 447
P.2d 248, 253; contra, Maiorino v. Weco Products Co. (1965), 45 N.J.
570, 214 A.2d 18.
Id.
G6As outlined in the text, the fifth district in Williams and Adams accepted and urged the comment n position. The fourth district in Dunham,
abandoning its position in Brandenburg, approved of comment n, as did a
Cook County division of the first district in Sweeney. Only in Vlahovich,
in the third district, was a contrary position taken.
67 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., No. 41425 (March, 1969).
68 Id.
69 Id.

70I
Oid.
71 Id.
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any change in results; the benefits to the plaintiff would be illusory. Under comment n the plaintiff would not need to negate
his own misconduct by the objective standard. But, in proving
the existence of an unreasonably dangerous condition the plaintiff nevertheless would be required to prove the very fact he
sought to eliminate from his cause of action - that an ordinary
man would not have discovered or guarded against the possibility
of the defect.72 The court concluded this from §402A, comment
3
i,7
which says:
The article sold must be dangerous to the extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchased it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics.
The court also discounted the operational difference between
objective and subjective standards, saying it was mainly a "matter of semantics" with very little difference in effect.7 4 The court
implied that no matter what the rule on plaintiff's conduct the
reasonable man standard would remain persuasive: "There are
few instances in which a plaintiff has recovered in the face of
proof indicating a reasonable man would not have acted as plaintiff did. ' 75 So, because due care by the objective standard was
part of plaintiff's case, both in proving the unreasonably dangerous condition and in convincing the trier of fact of the justice
of his action, the supreme court held that there was no compelling
reason to change the requirement that plaintiff plead and prove
due care. 6 The court therefore reversed on the pleadings and
instructions."
It cannot be said that the court based its decision on either
view of strict liability mentioned earlier. In its opinion the results of strict liability action would be the same no matter which
view were taken.78 However, the rhetoric of the opinion and the
holding would suggest that the court leaned toward the view that
79
strict liability was mainly a procedural development.
72

Id.

73 The view that comment n was inconsistent with comment i was ad-

vanced by defendant. Brief for Defendant at 14-15, Williams v. Brown Mfg.
Co., No. 41425.
74 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., No. 41425 (March, 1969).
The cases and commentators, in saying that the differences are a matter of semantics, mean that the comment n distinction is followed whether
contributory negligence is by name accepted or rejected as a defense to strict
liability. See, e.g., Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791,
838 (1966) ; Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111, 114 (N.H.
1969). The supreme court, however, means that there will be no difference
in result whether or not the comment n distinction is accepted.
5Id.
76Id.

77 Id.

79Id.
ToId. This Is especially true of the court's preliminary survey of strict

liability.
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The court's reluctance to abandon the reasonable man standard was evidently the overriding factor in its decision. The
court's inclination was probably reinforced by the convenience
of retaining established rules. Symmetry in negligence and strict
liability defenses was maintained or achieved, depending on one's
view, and difficulties in revising Illinois assumption of risk law
were avoided.80
THE NEW POSITION TAKEN

After a rehearing, the supreme court reversed its decision
on contributory negligence and revised its opinion accordingly. 1
The court observed that plaintiff's conduct may bar recovery in
tort actions and such conduct is often treated within the general
concept of "contributory negligence." The court implied that,
while this is appropriate in negligence actions, greater plaintiff
culpability may be required to bar recovery in strict liability actions.82 The court approved the more specific concepts of "misuse" and "assumption of risk" as bars to recovery in strict liability actions.8 8 In answer to the question whether the broad concept of contributory negligence or only misuse and assumption
of risk should bar recovery, the court said policy reasons dictated
a change in the rule and noted that, " . . . all other jurisdictions
The
...have reached substantially the same conclusion .. .

court held:
[C]ontributory negligence, as it is known in this state, is not a bar
to recovery in a strict product liability tort action in Illinois, and
the plaintiff need not plead and prove his exercise of due care. In
reject any contrary positions
adopting this position, we of course
85
suggested in Bua or elsewhere.
Then, discussing the trial court's treatment of assumption of
risk, the court found that there was some evidence that Williams
was aware of the operator's proper position and more substantial
evidence that he was aware of the danger of improper adjustment.8 8 The court then made important corollary holdings on assumption of risk and the test that should be used:
We emphasize that 'assumption of risk' is an affirmative defense which does bar recovery, and which may be asserted in a
strict liability action notwithstanding the absence of any contractual relationship between the parties. Furthermore, while the test
to be applied in determining whether a user has assumed the risk of
80 See text following note 42 supra. Barrett v. Fritz, 42 Ill. 2d 529, 248

N.E.2d 111 (1969), refused to extend the assumption of risk defense beyond
master-servant and contractual relationship cases.
81 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 425, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309
(1970).
82 Id. at 425, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
88 Id. at 425-26, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
s4 Id. at 426, 261 N.E.2d at 310.
85 Id. at 427, 261 N.E.2d at 310.
86 Id. at 427-30, 261 N.E.2d at 310-12.
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using a product known to be dangerously defective is fundamentally
a subjective test, in the sense that it is his knowledge, understanding and appreciation of the danger which must be assessed, rather
than that of the reasonably prudent person, it must also be remembered that this is ordinarily a question to be determined by the
jury. That determination is not to be made solely on the basis of
the user's own statements but rather upon the jury's assessment of
all of the facts established by the evidence. No juror is compelled
by the subjective nature of this test to accept a user's testimony
that he was unaware of the danger, if, in the light of all of the
evidence, he could not have been unaware of the hazard; and the
factors of the user's age, experience, knowledge and understanding,
as well as the obviousness of the defect and the danger it poses,
will all be relevant to the jury's determination of the issue, if
raised.87

The court then reversed because the directed verdict for
plaintiff on assumption of risk was error in view of the evidence
that Williams was aware of the dangers. The court remanded
for a new trial under proper instructions2 8

In discussing the concept of misuse, the court twice said that
it may bar recovery 9 and indicated that it was the only plaintiff

misconduct besides assumption of risk which should bar recovery.90

The definition 9 ' was given as ". .. use for a purpose
neither intended nor 'foreseeable' (objectively reasonable) by the
defendant .... ,,92 Since "[t] his issue may arise in connection
with plaintiff's proof of an unreasonably dangerous condition or
in proximate cause or both,"9 3 the plaintiff apparently has the
burden of proof, although the defendant has the burden of coming forward.
Id. at 430-31, 261 N.E.2d at 312.
Id. at 431, 261 N.E.2d at 312.
The court's debt to the article Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses
Based on Plaintiff Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 267 should be recognized
because the cases the court cites in its survey of the law are more fully detailed in the article and because much of the court's helpful dictum on misuse originated in Epstein's article. To avoid the confusion and resolve any
unnecessary conflict over contributory negligence in products liability, Epstein related the results of cases to whether they involved negligent failure
to discover the defective condition, which he called "contributory negligence,"
use after discovery, called "assumption of risk," or use not reasonably foreseeable, called "misuse." Epstein observed that contributory negligence, as
usually defined, included all three categories and the supreme court noted
that was true in Illinois. The supreme court utilized Epstein's categories
and research in both of its opinions.
89 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I1. 2d 418, 425, 431, 261 N.E.2d 305,
309, 312 (1970). This was expected. Ozman, Products Liability under the
Suvada Theory, 55 ILL. B.J. 906, 907 (1967) ; Prosser, The Pall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 824 (1966).
90 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 427, 261 N.E.2d 305,. 310
(1970).
91 The first opinion quoted the alternative name "unanticipated use"
also. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., No. 41425 (March, 1969).
92 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill: 2d 418, 425, 261 N.E.2d 305; 309
(1970).
98 Id. at 431, 261 N.E.2d at 312.
87
88
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WHY THE COURT REVERSED ITSELF

After first minimizing the importance of its reversal by
characterizing rule difference as "more semantical than substantial,

'9 4

the court offered an illustration of how its earlier opinion

had been misunderstood" 5 and said: "[W] e are persuaded that it
is necessary to review our position and adopt a more appropriate
and workable framework.

.

.

.

"

The new position was more

"workable" in the sense that the bar had found the circuitous
reasoning of the first opinion confusing and misleading. 7 The
new position was more "appropriate" to the view of strict liability underlying comment n.
The court indicated its acceptance of the comment n rationale by adopting the appellate court's reasoning. The supreme
court said: "[T]he policy considerations which led us to adopt
strict tort liability in Suvada compel the elimination of 'contributory negligence' as a bar to recovery." 98 Three reasons had
been given in Suvada: protection of life and health, the advertising inducements to purchase products, and the justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and reaping the profit.9
However, the court evidently had in mind the reasoning of the
appellate court opinion, where the same wording was used:
"[T]he same reasoning which justifies the doctrine of strict liability compels the adoption of the rule. .

. ."10

The appellate

court was relying on the defendant's duty to make the product
safe for the use intended, aided by his expert knowledge.1 01 The
appellate court felt that the defendant's duty to protect against
objectively discoverable dangers should not be compromised by
contributory negligence. The supreme court by implication
agreed.
94 Id. at 424, 261 N.E.2d at 309. See note 74 supra. It is not clear
whether the court means comment n or the objective standard naturally followed in judging plaintiff's conduct.
95 [O]ur earlier opinion in this case apparently was thought to imply
that every plaintiff in a strict product liability action in Illinois was
l rdcsfrptnildfcs,
oiset
a o"dtledndprv
suc
an insecio wo
under falue
losiuteabrt and that
Id. at 425, 261 N.E.2d at 309. See, e.g., Symposium, Illinois Supreme Court
Review,
64 Nw. v.
U.L.
REV. 909,
9 Williams
Brown
Mfg.914
Co.,(1969).
45 Ill. 2d 418, 425, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309

(1970).

97 See note 95 supra.
98 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 426, 261 N.E.2d 305, 310
(1970).
99 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186
(1965).
The court referred to these reasons in its first opinion, refining the second and third somewhat. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., No. 41425 (March,
1969).
100 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 348, 236 N.E.2d
125, 133 (1968).
101 See note 26 supra.
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An apparent desire for sound, uniform, clear rules in this
troublesome area explains why the court found it provident to
outline the whole area of conduct on the part of the plaintiff
which bars recovery in strict liability. It explains why guidelines
were offered on misuse. The court's desire for clarity also explains why it did not affirm the appellate court's definition of contributory negligence or rename assumption of risk contributory
fault, 10 2 but took the more positive position of accepting assumption of risk by name. The reversal was also undoubtedly influenced by the knowledge that adopting comment n would bring
Illinois into accord with other authority.103
EFFECT OF THE DECISION

The Williams case decided how Illinois will treat contributory negligence in strict liability. However, one tends to agree
with the court's initial appraisal that adopting comment n will
make little difference in the outcome of cases. In the Sweeney
case,10 4 where the young, inexperienced carpenter continued to
strike shattering concrete nails, a jury could grant or deny recovery by either the objective or the subjective standard. Using the
objective standard, how nearly the reasonable man's situation
parallels the plaintiff's would be determinative. Using the subjective standard, how obvious the defect appears would be determinative. Similar flexibility in the standards may be imagined in the cases where food which tastes "funny" proves to contain a foreign body. 05 The standards seem to be sufficiently malleable for the fact finder to be able to render what he considers
substantial justice. In fact, it would appear that whenever negligent failure to discover the defect would be an issue by the objective standard, how obvious the defect appears would be determinative of the case by the subjective standard. So the
plaintiff's victory may be largely in theory.
The court's pronouncement that assumption of risk is available without any contractual relationship follows the recommendation in Sweeney 00 that the Illinois assumption of risk doctrine be
modified, at least as it relates to strict liability. Whether as102 Cf. Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463 472, 251 A.2d 278,
283 (1969), citing Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791,
838; Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's
Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REv. 627, 653 (1968).
103 Between the first and second opinions, New Jersey, the minority of
one, moved closer to the comment n position. Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing,
Inc., 53 N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969).
104 Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968). See
note 41 supra.
1o5 E.g., Barefield v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120
N.W.2d 786 (1963); Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal.

Rptr. 276 (1962).
106 Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968).

text following note 42 supra.

See
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sumption of risk as a defense in strict liability will develop distinctly from the doctrine of assumption of risk in master-servant
and other contractual relationships remains to be seen. 107
'
The court's extended discussion of the objective factors, such
as the obviousness of the defect, which the jury may consider in
weighing the plaintiff's story is probably partly attributable to
the court's lingering affinity to the reasonable man standard. It
probably also reassures those, including the court, who would
otherwise see in the subjective standard a greater opportunity
for perjury. It may well prevent some unwarranted recoveries
and reconcile some members of the bar to the new rules.
The court in recognizing misuse as a defensive concept was
appropriately vague, since its remarks were dicta. The court did
indicate that proper use need not be pleaded; but, if it became
an issue plaintiff would have the burden of proof as proper use
would then be essential to an element of his cause of action.'08
The test was given as whether the use was objectively foreseeable
by the defendant. Instructions and rulings on misuse may find
it convenient to distinguish proper purpose of use from proper
manner of use.
Tactically, the plaintiff has been relieved of a formal pleading requirement and the defendant has traded what many defense counsel probably consider the relatively ineffectual defense
of contributory negligence'0 9 for the two specific defenses of assumption of risk and misuse. 110
CONCLUSION

After first refusing to adopt comment n of §402A because
peculiarities of Illinois law and the lack of differences in result
made it more convenient to retain the Illinois contributory negligence rule, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed itself on rehearing to clarify the rules and its position on the doctrine of strict
liability. The court eliminated the requirement that plaintiff
plead due care, removed contributory negligence by name as a defense, adopted assumption of risk as an affirmative defense, and
detailed its fundamentally subjective standard. Helpful dicta on
107 For a survey of the various types of assumption of risk with a
review of Prosser's and Harper and James' categories, see Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Product Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 122 (1961).
108 See text at note 93 supra.
109 Cf. Bushnell, Illusory Defense of Contributory Negligence in Product
Liability, 12 CLEV. MAR. L. REV. 412 (1963).
110 The reasonable man standard may still be available to the defendant.
The court said nothing to weaken its earlier position that plaintiff's conduct
by the objective standard is involved in his proof of an unreasonably dangerous condition. Also, the objective floor of the subjective standard affords
resourceful defendants' counsel and judges who resist the court's decision
an opportunity to emphasize objective considerations. This could create a
difficult situation to review.

110
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misuse was also announced. While the new rules are a victory
for those who view strict liability as a substantive change in the
law, and while the rules require changes in pleadings and tactics,
probably few, if any, additional plaintiff recoveries will result.
Robert Mayhew

